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Book Review of Sex and International 
Tribunals: The Erasure of Gender from the War 




Throughout history, sexual violence has been pervasive in wars, but in-
ternational humanitarian law has only recently recognized such violence as 
a crime.  Largely as a result of human rights advocacy, international human 
rights treaties, declarations, and protocols have begun to address the 
unique issues of rape in armed conflict and gender-based violence as a tool 
of war. The newly adopted international treaties, declarations, and proto-
cols encourage states to employ an analysis of the role of gender identities 
in conflict in transitional justice and conflict resolution strategies.  The hu-
man rights movement has thus made significant strides in bringing a nu-
anced gender perspective into armed conflict. Unfortunately, transitional 
justice bodies have not kept pace with these international instruments.2  
In Sex and International Tribunals: The Erasure of Gender from the War Nar-
rative, Chiseche Salome Mibenge evaluates the failures of international jus-
tice mechanisms to provide an effective narrative of gender-based violence.  
In particular, she focuses on the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone 
(TRC), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).  She argues that these 
justice processes have remained mired in the “first tier” of international 
human rights law.  
First tier instruments support formal equality between men and 
women.  They protect women’s private roles, namely their biological re-
productive potential, but fail to recognize the realities of gender discrimina-
tion and the range of identities that women hold.  They thus universalize 
the experience of women.3  For example, by focusing on the physical pain 
and biological damage that an individual woman experiences when she is 
raped, international justice bodies have failed to recognize the long-term 
social consequences of this violence, such as the damage to their unique 
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roles as caregivers of children.4  Through a critique of the way that these 
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies have treated gender-based violence, 
Mibenge argues that the reduction of women to sexual victims defined 
solely by their biological capacities fails to recognize the depth and breadth 
of the harms suffered by both women and men in armed conflict.  Such an 
“essentializing” process only reinforces stereotypes of African men as 
“abusers” and African women as “victims.”   
Mibenge argues that the ICTR’s treatment of gender-based violence in-
accurately creates a narrative that the only true victims of sexual violence 
are Tutsi women. The Tribunal failed to engage in a thorough analysis of 
the way that sexual violence was employed during the conflict and how it 
affected gender relations. The exclusive focus on the persecution of Tutsis, 
particularly the rapes of Tutsi women by Hutu men, inappropriately priori-
tize the victim’s ethnic identity over her other identities that contribute to 
her vulnerability.5  The emphasis on ethnicity and the physical effects of 
widespread rapes on the Tutsi population fails to recognize the gendered 
dimensions of the act.  This is deeply problematic, because “Tutsi women 
occupied identities outside of their ethnicities, and this fact exaggerated 
vulnerability or even provided temporary immunity from violence depend-
ing on the circumstances.”6  In most cases, Hutu women were entirely pre-
vented from testifying before Tribunals, becuase they were not members of 
the group who suffered genocide.  The ICTR also limited the narrative by 
failing to address the gendered nature of violence against men.  Its refusal 
to treat castration as a sexual crime suggested that only women could be 
the victims of gender-based violence.7 
Although it is true that the narrative that emerges from the ICTR is not 
a complete and accurate representation of the experience of gender-based 
violence during the genocide, this is not necessarily a shortcoming of the 
trials.  The ICTR, like all international tribunals, is limited in its jurisdiction 
and resources.  For better or for worse, the tribunal has focused primarily 
on genocide.  Indeed, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR Statute) states that the tribunal is responsible for “prosecut-
ing persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law.”8  In order to constitute genocide, a crime 
must be targeted against “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”9  
Furthermore, the ICTR Statute states that crimes against humanity must be 
similarly directed against one of these groups.  Consequently, Mibenge’s 
argument that the experiences of male victims of sexual violence should 
have been incorporated into the trials has a solid grounding in the ICTR 
Statute.   
Nevertheless, Hutu victims generally fall outside of the jurisdiction of 
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the Tribunal.  Mibenge argues that the limited jurisdiction of the ICTR nec-
essarily excludes Hutu men and women from the narrative of gender-based 
violence and diminishes their experience.  However, she fails to recognize 
that a court whose jurisdiction is limited to a small percentage of crimes 
perpetrated during the genocide cannot possibly provide a complete and 
nuanced record.   
Furthermore, Mibenge’s claim that the trials result in immunity for 
perpetrators who raped for non-ethnic reasons is unfounded.  The ICTR 
was not intended to be the sole body to try perpetrators of violence.  The 
Rwandan government tried many rape cases in conventional courts and 
later the Gacaca courts.  Although these systems certainly have their own 
failings, the expectation that an international criminal tribunal should be 
responsible for providing a complete narrative of gender-based violence is 
impractical.  It may well be a valid critique that the ICTR was intended to 
be the sole representation of the victims’ experience of the genocide.  How-
ever, a more thorough analysis would examine the narrative that emerges 
from the local and international justice processes in conjunction with the 
ICTR experience, in order to evaluate whether sexual violence has been 
dealt effectively post-conflict.  
Mibenge also criticizes the SCSL for essentializing women as rape vic-
tims without individual agency.  The Prosecutor’s categorization of crimes 
and choice of witnesses resulted in a narrative in which men are combat-
ants who perpetrate sexual violence while women are victims whose expe-
riences of conflict are unavoidably sexualized.  Although many girls did 
serve as combatants, both on the front lines and in critical support roles, 
they were almost never called as witnesses in cases on child soldiers.10  Fur-
thermore, Mibenge argues that the Prosecutor’s use of the crimes of forced 
marriage and sexual slavery (primarily applied to female victims) as dis-
tinct from the crime of enslavement (primarily applied to male victims) un-
necessarily sexualized the experience of women and limited the tribunal’s 
ability to create a narrative that included the gender based nature of the 
crimes perpetrated against men who were enslaved.  In reality, Mibenge 
claims, the crime of enslavement already incorporates the sexual violence 
experienced by enslaved women, and so should be applied to both men 
and women; there is no need for a distinct category of sexual slavery 
crimes.11  These prosecutorial choices restrict the representation of women’s 
experience in conflict to sexual violence and preclude the prosecution of the 
sexual nature of men’s enslavement during the war.  They thus “maintain 
and indeed reinforce a patriarchal construction of African women as rape 
victims or potential rape victims.  Women in conflict societies are cast in a 
perpetual state of sexual vulnerability and passivity.”12  
The implications of Mibenge’s critiques of the SCSL are deeply trou-
bling.  If the state limits women’s experiences in armed conflict to sexual 
violence, women are likely to be deprived of the benefits of demobilization 
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programs.  Women’s unique needs as ex-combatants are often ignored be-
cause they have been excluded from the child soldier narrative.  If men’s 
experience of sexual violence in enslavement is ignored, rehabilitative pro-
grams will undoubtedly exclude many male victims in need of assistance.   
However, the critique of the crime of sexual slavery seems to be a prob-
lem of application rather than definition. Distinguishing sexual slavery 
from enslavement seems to benefit constructing an accurate narrative and 
ensuring the efficacy of post-conflict programs. For example, women who 
were enslaved chiefly for sexual purposes may have had children while in 
captivity, and will thus need different forms of support than those who 
were enslaved for labor.  Although a distinct crime of sexual slavery may 
not be necessary from a legal perspective, if applied without neglecting the 
possibility that men may experience sexual slavery, it may facilitate a 
deeper understanding of the experiences of those who were enslaved.  
Mibenge’s categorical rejection of the crimes of enslavement and forced 
marriage may thus be misplaced.  The court’s reluctance to consider the 
possibility that men and women can experience both sexual and nonsexual 
enslavement is the core of the problem. 
Of Mibenge’s three critiques, her analysis of Sierra Leone’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) is most compelling.  As they are not re-
quired to comply with the legal requirements of trial, TRCs are better suited 
to the creation of a nuanced narrative of gender-based violence in armed 
conflict.  They permit a more thorough and culturally grounded evaluation 
of conflict. However, Mibenge argues that, like the tribunals, Sierra Leone’s 
TRC essentialized the experiences of men and women and has created a 
narrative of “absolute and perpetual victimhood for women and girls in 
war and peace.”13  By focusing on the failure of Sierra Leonean culture to 
prevent violence against women and equating early marriage during peace-
time with sexual enslavement during war, the TRC report failed to recog-
nize nuances in the experiences of men and women.  It thereby neglected 
any discussion of the ways that women exercise power and agency on a 
daily basis in their relationships with their husbands and the community.14  
Mibenge focuses on the way this narrative furthers stereotypes of 
women as victims and delegitimizes culture by associating traditional mar-
riage practices with sexual violence.  But she fails to note that the wholesale 
rejection of customary law and cultural practices can also impede access to 
justice.  Local justice mechanisms are critical to establishing a thorough and 
nuanced narrative of the harms suffered in armed conflict.  Mibenge ac-
knowledges that customary law could vitiate the human rights of women.  
A better response, however, would be a critical evaluation of customary 
law that suggests areas of improvement, rather than merely focusing on the 
TRC’s degradation of culture and essentialization of gender roles.  
 Sex in International Tribunals provides a compelling argument for the 
failure of international transitional justice mechanisms in Rwanda and Si-
erra Leone to construct a nuanced narrative of gender based violence in 
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armed conflict.  Mibenge clearly illustrates the inadequacies of these sys-
tems to address the variety of experiences of conflict and the complexity of 
victim identities.  Her discussion of the multitude of experiences of civil 
war and the gendered experiences of violence is certainly enlightening.  
However, her failure to examine additional narratives of gender-based vio-
lence and to provide any practical suggestions for incorporating a more in-
dividualized and culturally sensitive perspective limits the effectiveness of 
the argument.  Although Mibenge illuminates the challenge of creating nu-
anced transitional justice processes, legal scholars and proponents of transi-
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